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TORTS
WILLIAM A. KOLODGYO and GERALD N. CAPPS"
INTRODUCTION
In selecting the materials1 for this survey the authors solicited opinions
from practitioners in the field and professors of tort law in the law schools
of our state. It was felt that in this way, by cooperative effort and con-
currence of opinion, greater emphasis might be placed upon the more "active
areas" of Florida tort law. The response was gratifying indeed.2
The cases covered in the following pages are limited in number, consti-
tuting somewhat less than half of those which sounded in tort before the
Supreme Court of Florida during the survey period. As in past surveys, we
have eliminated those cases which dealt primarily with Workmen's Com-
pensation, Master-Servant, Damages, Evidence, and Procedure. In addition,
a large number of cases which consisted of little more than a review of
fact determinations and which added nothing new to the existing body
of substantive tort principles were omitted. By narrowing the selection,
our aim was to provide a higher degree of subjective analysis, where war-
ranted, within available limitations of time and space.
In classifying our research and making a topical breakdown, we en-
deavored to conform to traditional academic subdivisions as nearly as
possible. However, as was stated by our predecessors, "when troubles come
they come not single file but in battalions . - . ." For this reason and
because of the far-reaching importance of certain key decisions4 some de-
viations were felt necessary. Special emphasis was placed on the subsection
under negligence dealing with statutory problems and a separate section was
*Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review.
**Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. The materials used in this survey were selected from Volumes 80 through 95,
Southern Reporter, Second Series; Volume 11, Miami Law Quarterly; Volume 9, Uni-
versity of Florida Law Review and various sections of the 1955 and 1957 Florida
Statutes cited throughout the article. Also included was one case, Keman v. American
Dredging Co. 78 Sup.Ct. 394 (1958) from the United States Reporter in the section
on Federal Statutes-Jones Act.
2. The authors would like to express their gratitude to all who rendered aid
in compiling the materials for this survey. We especially wish to acknowledge the
aid given by Mr. Sam Daniels, with the law firm of Nichols, Gaither, Green, Frates
& Beekham, Miami, Florida; Professor George H. Pickar, University of Miami School
of Law and Professor Leonard S. Powers and Professor Hayford 0. Enwall, University
of Florida College of Law.
3.. Anderson and Smith, TORTs, 8 MIAMi L.Q. 477 (1954).
4. See. Keran v. American Dredging Co., 78 Slp. Ct. 394 (1958), infra page 487
under section I.J.(3), Federal Statutes-Jone's Act; Hargrove v. Coca Beach. 96 So.2d
130 (Fla. 1957), infra page 492 under section Il. C. Municipal Tort Liability; and
Brailsford v. Campbell, 89 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1956), infra page 483 and Shiver v. Sessions,
80 So.2d 905 (Via. 1955), infra page 481 under section I.J.(1)., Wrongful Death
Statutes.
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set up concerning extension of liability. The balance of the section on
negligence is broad in scope and covers a multitude of problems. Intentional
torts received but cursory treatment; actions in this area were few and,
with an exception or two, were of little consequence.
The material in this article is arranged in the following order:
I. NEcLIGENCE
A. Degree of Care - General
(1) Same -Business Invitee or Mere Licensee
(2) Same--Discovered Trespasser
B. Proximate Cause
C. Res Ipsa Loquitur
D. Physician and Surgeons - Malpractice
E. Last Clear Chance





(1) Wrongful Death Statutes
(2) Guest Statute
(3) Federal Statutes -Federal Employer's Liability Act
Same - Jones Act
(4) Release - Covenant not to sue - Joint-tortfeasors
II. EXTENSION OF LIABILFIY
A. Parent and Child
B. Manufacturers' Liability
C. Municipal Tort Liability
III. INTENTIONAL TORTS
A. Malicious Prosecution
B. Libel and Slander





A. DEGREE OF CARE - GENERAL
Not infrequently motions for dismissal were voiced in the circuit
courts of Florida during the past two years. Many were granted upon the
ground that the pleader failed to allege a sufficiently high degree of negli-
gence for liability to attach. These cases arose in various ways, but it is
interesting to note, that a majority of the appeals turned on the question
of whether the plaintiff was a "business invitee" or a "mere licensee." Be-
cause of the frequency of these cases, the authors have decided to further
subdivide this section.
1. SAME - BUSINESS INVITEE OR LlcasKE
Although no cases of note were found during this period where the
Supreme Court of Florida defined what degree of care is owed to a
business invitee, it is clear that the only duty owed to a mere licensee is to
refrain from gross negligence. In other words, a licensee is only entitled to
a slight degree of care.
Illustrative of the cases which turn on this point is Steinberg v. Irwin
Operating Company.5 The Plaintiff entered a hotel for the purpose of
visiting a registered guest. After calling at the hotel desk and discovering
that the guest was not there, the plaintiff ventured to the hotel T.V. room
and from there to the movie room. The floor between the movie room,
which was dark except for the illumination coming from the projector, was
recessed four inches from the floor in the T.V. room. Not noticing the
recess, plaintiff fell and was injured. The trial court granted a summary
judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the court affirmed the ruling on
the ground that plaintiff was a "mere licensee." The court said: 6
We are of the view that one entering a hotel to communicate with
a registered guest is entitled to receive and enjoy the same degree of
care [applicable to business inviteesh However, .... The invitation
to enter the hotel to visit a guest extends only to appropriate usage
of the means of ingress and egress, such as, the lobby, elevator,
hallways and room area rented to the guest.
When the plaintiff ventured off on her own to sightsee, her status as
an implied invitee ended. Thus, the plaintiff was precluded from recovery
since no gross negligence was proved.
Another case, Eisen v. Sportogs, Incorporated,7 involved another
typical situation, that is: a visit to a store. In the particular fact situation
the store was operated as a "one man corporation" by the plaintiff's son, and
5. 90 So.ld 460 (Fla. 1956).
6. Id. at 461.
7. 87 So.2d 44 (F2. 1956).
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the primary purpose of the plaintiff's visit was to voluntarily deliver a
package to the plaintiff's husband, who was an employee on duty at
defendant-son's store. After delivering the package, which was needed
in her husband's work, the plaintiff ventured off to the store's lobby to
visit a restroom, tripped on a loose rug on the stairway and was injured. The
supreme court held that it was doubtful that the plaintiff had been an
invitee at all, and that even if she had been, once she ventured off to the
restroom she was a "mere licensee." Recovery was denied on a claim of
ordinary negligence.
A third, though less typical type of case involving the invitee-licensee
question, was Boca Raton v. Mattef.8 The plaintiff-widow sought to recover
for the wrongful death of her husband who fell from a water tower which
he had offered to paint for the city. The city council had accepted the
offer upon condition that the decedent communicate with the city attorney
and execute a contract "to protect the Town's interest" before proceeding
with the work. In disregard of this condition, the decedent proceeded to
the tower, and with the help of the superintendent of the town's water
plant, hoisted his equipment and commenced working. The supreme court
affirmed the entry of judgment on the verdict which found that the decedent
was a "mere licensee." The rationale used a process of elimination. First
the court determined that the decedent was not a business invitee since
he failed to meet the condition precedent and since the water plant super-
intendent did not have charge of the tower nor authority to invite. But
the court reasoned, even though the superintendent could not authorize
entrance to the tower as an invitee, the decedent was not a trespasser
since an agent of the city knew of his presence and did not stop the entrance.
Hence, the decedent as "one whose presence on the property of another
is tolerated or permitted but not invited,"9 was a "mere licensee."
As was pointed out in the opening remarks to this section, there were
no cases found during this period which defined the degree of care owed
to a business invitee. In view of the traditional relationships of innkeeper-
guest and carrier-passenger, it would be dangerous to establish one fixed
degree of care which would attach whenever the label "business invitee"
is applied. Apparently, this is not the case under existing Florida law as
was said in a previous decision: 10
Where a person .. . invites a member of the public into his
place of busines, he ...owes such a person a duty with respect
to his safety which may vary with the circumstances of each case
.In any event there is a duty to have the place of business in a
8. 91 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1956).
9. Id. at 648.
10. Southern Express Co. v. Williamson, 66 FIa. 286, 63 So. 433 (1913).
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reasonably safe condition. And the care required depends upon the
circumstances of each case."
The case of Edwards v. Jacksonville Coach Comrpany12 concerned the
degree of care owed to a passenger by a common carrier, and although the
language of the decision does not make reference to an "invitee," it would
seem clear that the plaintiff-passenger was a business invitee. There the
plaintiff, a 67 year old 210 pound passenger with one arm in a cast, was
injured while debarking from a bus standing 18 to 24 inches from the curb
when her dress was caught in a prematurely closed rear door. The plaintiff
attempted to debark from the front door, which was open and clear, but
was ordered to exit from the rear door which was so arranged as to require
the use of the passenger's hands in holding the door open. In affirming
recovery for the plaintiff, the supreme court said that due to the high
degree of care traditionally owed in a carrier passenger relationship, the
driver was required to take notice of the plaintiff's infirmities. 3
2. SAME - DISCOVERED TRESPASSER
An interesting case, Byers v. Gunn, 4 which was noted in the University
of Florida Law Review,' arose out of a teen-age frolic. After being refused
a ride by the defendant's teen-aged daughter, the plaintiff and three other
boys seated themselves on the front fenders of defendant's car. Notwith-
standing the position of the plaintiff, the daughter accelerated the car to
a speed in excess of fifteen miles per hour and then applied the brakes in
a manner so sudden as to throw the plaintiff to the ground and injure him.
Defendant pleaded that the plaintiff was a mere trespasser and appealed
an adverse ruling. The supreme court held that notwithstanding the
plaintiff's status as a trespasser, a reasonable and ordinary degree of care
was owed to him since his presence was discovered by and known to the
driver. It would seem that Florida has adopted a general rule that ordinary
care is owed to discovered trespassers. It is interesting to note that other
jurisdictions which base the degree of care on the relationships of trespasser,
licensee, invitee, etc. . . . have achieved the same result as in the instant
case by holding that failure to exercise ordinary care upon discovery of
peril imminent to a trespasser constitutes gross negligence in itself.18 Of
course, the difference is semantic but the rationale is more consistent with
the language customarily employed.
11. See also, Rubey v. William Morris Inc., 66 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1953); Goldin v.
Lipkind, 49 So.2d 539 (1950); and Haile v. Mason Hotel and Invest. Co., 71 Fla. 469,
71 So. 540 (1916) which establish that an ordinary degree of care is owed to "hotel-
business invitees."
12. 88 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1956).
13. See also, Loftin v. Florida Cities Bus Co., 159 Fla. 514, 32 So.2d 166
(1947); Tampa Electric Co. v. Fleisehaker, 152 Fla. 701, 12 So.2d 901 (1943); and
Florida R.R. v. Dorsey, 59 Fla. 260, 52 So. 963 (1910).
14. 81 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1955).
15. Case Comment, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 106 (1956).
16. Id. at 107.
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B. PROXIMATE CAUSE
The authors selected two cases dealing with proximate cause decided
by the Florida Supreme Court during the survey period. In Johnson v.
Pike,'7 an action against the defendant, a supermarket, was brought for
injury sustained by an infant. The defendants operated a parking lot in con-
junction with their business and located on this lot was a merry-go-round
which apparently was there to entertain the customer's children. The
plaintiff, a six year old, was driven to the store by his adult brother-in-law.
The brother-in-law stopped the car in the lot apparently with the intent of
letting the plaintiff out to go to the merry-go-round. When the child
alighted he ran around the back of the car and was struck by a slow moving
automobile. The complaint alleged that the parking lot was not supervised,
and that it should have been since the location of the merry-go-round
attracted children; it was free; and the defendants should have known that
because of these facts, children of immature age would be subjected o
certain dangers; i.e., cars. The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff
and the supreme court reversed. The general rule is that owners of parking
lots must keep their premises in a reasonably safe condition for the intended
use. It is also a matter of common knowledge that customers of super-
markets are often accompanied by their children and that the use of such
a parking facility must contemplate the presence of children. However,
the court further stated that it has heretofore held that there is nothing
inherently dangerous about a parking lot. In the instant case, the plaintiff's
contended that the defendant's failure to supervise the parking lot and the
movement of the cars was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
The court reasoned that the cause was the plaintiff's impulsive dartings in
front of a slow moving vehicle. The plaintiffs have the burden of showing
the breach of some duty owed by the defendants to the plaintiff before
the breach of this duty could be termed the proximate cause of the injury.
The other case involving proximate cause was that of Brightwell v.
Beem.'8 The evidence was as follows: the plaintiff, a fifteen year old girl,
dived off a dock at a private amusement part and struck the bottom so as
to sever her spinal cord and became permanently crippled. The witnesses
stated that in diving, the plaintiff's foot slipped or became twisted in such
a fashion so that her body entered the water in a distorted position. The
water was two feet below the dock and three and one-half feet in depth.
The defendent contended that this was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury and also that the dock was not intended for diving and that a "no
diving" sign was posted. (No evidence appeared in the record to show
that such a sign existed.) It also appeared that on the day that plaintiff's
17. 87 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1956)
18. 90 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1956).
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injury occurred, the dock was being heavily used for diving by other paying
customers and this appeared to be known by the defendant. The trial court
directed a verdict for the defendant and on appeal the supreme court
reversed, holding that the question of proximate cause and contributory
negligence should have gone to the jury.
C. REs IPSA LoQurrUR
In the case of Burkett v. Panama City Coca-Cola Bottling Company,0
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held to be inapplicable.. In this
case the plaintiff had purchased a crate of Coca-Colas from a retail store.
The crate was placed in the plaintiff's automobile and driven approximately
two miles over a dirt road to the point of destination. As the plaintiff was
taking the bottles from the car, one exploded in his hand. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment which was affirmed
by the supreme court. The court held that in cases involving the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must make an affirmative showing that after
the bottle left the control of the bottling company it was not subjected to
outside forces, and no reasonable inference could be drawn, showing the
outside forces to be the cause of the explosion. In the instant case, it
appeared from the evidence, that several of the bottles had fallen to the
floor during the journey, thus exposing them to "extraneous harmful in-
fluences," hence prohibiting a claim based upon res ipsa loquitur against
the manufacturer.
D. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS - MALPRACTICE
In this field, the authors have selected three cases decided by the
Florida Supreme Court during the survey period. The first case is that of
Baldor v. Rogers.20 Here the doctor had been treating the plaintiff for lip
cancer by "shots." As the treatment continued the cancer spread and
became somewhat worse. Finally, the doctor discharged the plaintiff without
making further medical arrangements. The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff on the ground that the doctor should have known the treat-
ment was of no avail and he breached his duty to the plaintiff by failing
to tell him of the situation and that the only hope of recovery lay in other
types of treatment. The supreme court reversed upon the grounds that
the treatment used by the doctor was sanctioned by the American Medical
Association as were other treatments and to approve the verdict would be
close to determining as a matter of law that some treatment, other than the
one used, was the right one. Justice Terrell and Drew dissented, reasoning
that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury, for them to determine
if the treatment should have been ceased and also if the doctor had breached
a duty in abandoning the plaintiff without first making other medical
19. 93 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1957).
20. 81 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1955).
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arrangements. Subsequently on rehearing, the lower court verdict was
affirmed, adopting the reason of the dissenting opinion of Justices Terrell
and Drew.
The second interesting case was that of Hine v. Fox .2 A doctor, while
removing moles from the face of the plaintiff with an electric cautery
instrument, burned the neck and upper part of her body as a result of the
dislocation of the blade from the instrument. The trial court entered judg-
ment for the defendant and the supreme court affirmed. The complaint of
the plaintiff alleged that the electric cautery was a dangerous instrument
and that the doctor had known or should have known that it was mechanic-
ally defective and that it was under the exclusive control and management
of the doctor and his servants. The defendant's answer denied liability,
alleging that the instrument was factory assembled; the blade was an integral
part thereof and not replaceable; that any defect was not detectable by he
defendant and if there was any liability, it would rest upon the manufacturer
of the the instrument. Part of the defendant's testimony was that at the
time the blade became dislocated, it dropped onto a towel placed around
the neck of the plaintiff and that in their joint effort to remove it, the bums
occurred. Hence, the court had to determine whether the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur was applicable, to make a prima facie case of negligence
against the doctor. The court stated that in charges of malpractice against
a professional man, negligence is not presumed, but must be proved. The
court had previously held the doctrine of res ipsa toquitur not applicable
in malpractice cases against surgeons where negligence was charged in the
diagnosis or treatment of the patient.22 The reason negligence will never
be presumed in such cases is not the money alone, but because of the
character and reputation of the person involved. The court further stated
that aside from diagnosis and treatment, the majority rule in regard to
instruments, is that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to
the breaking of instruments used by the doctor during operations. 8
The case of Stauf v. Holden24 appeared to be an exceptionally in-
teresting one to the authors. In this case the charge to the jury was as
follows: "In a case against a physician for malpractice, the professional
character and reputation of the physician is the more important matter at
stake, and hence he should not be condemned by evidence that does not
point to his negligence.' ' 25 Upon this charge the jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff and the supreme court reversed, holding the charge was
misleading and reversible error.
Query: Does not this case appear to be out of line with the afore-
mentioned Hine case? There the court stated that negligence should not
21. 89 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1956).
22. Id. at 15; see also, Foster v. Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 170 So. 459 (1936).
23. Ed. at 16.
24. 94 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1957).
25. Id. at 362.
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be presumed against a physician as his character and reputation were more
important than the money which might be recovered. The authors cannot
see why the above charge was misleading, if the decision in the Hine case
is the correct law in Florida. If it is, then should not the jury be made
aware of it through the judge's instructions?
E. LAST CLEAR CHANCE
In the case of Wodford v. Atlantic Company,20 an action was brought
for wrongful death. The plaintiff's decedent had parked his automobile'
along side the highway. The decedent was standing safely beside his auto-
mobile as a truck was approaching and at the time the truck was about
even with the decedent, he opened the door of his automobile. The truck
struck the door, causing the death of the decedent. The plaintiff contended
that the doctrine of last clear chance was applicable and that it was error
for the lower court to refuse to charge the jury on the application of the
doctrine. The judgment was for the defendant, and the supreme court
reversed, holding that the judge should have charged the jury on last clear
chance, in that it was certain that if the defendant had veered from his
course, the accident would have been avoided. Associate justice Dickinson
dissented, in that it appeared to him that the part of the truck which
struck the door of the decedent's automobile, was behind he cab. Hence,
the doctrine would not be applicable as the driver could not have possibly
avoided the accident, since if the truck was that far past the automobile
of the decedent, the driver of the truck could safely assume that the person
would not do anything to cause himself injury. To hold otherwise would
make a motorist an insurer of every pedestrian on or off the road.
F. RELEASE OF LIABILITY
The case of Russell v. Martin,2 7 was selected to be noted by the authors,
not such much because there was a question of negligence involved, but
because of the agreement which devolved around the tort itself. The plaintiff
brought an action against the railroad for the death of his minor son; the
accident occurring on a private crossing. The'railroad denied negligence and
also averred that there was an agreement entered into between the plaintiff
and the defendant, that in return for Russell's use of the private crossing
he had agreed to idemnify and save harmless the railroad, and further that
he, the plaintiff, would use the crossing at his own risk. The trial court
entered judgment for the defendant and the supreme court affirmed,
holding that the plaintiff's contention, that the agreement was against
public policy, was of no merit. In its opinion the court stated, "ordinarily
a common carrier's contract to save itself harmless from its negligence
when acting as a common carrier is ineffective, but it is not so when acting
26. 86 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1956).
27. 88 So.2d 315 (Fl2. 1956).
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in its private capacity.7 28 Such agreements in other jurisdictions have been
held not to contravene public policy and as Justice Terrell so adroitly
put it, "Public policy is a fickle concept."
29
Query. although other jurisdictions have held such agreements not
to contravene public policy, may one person sign away the rights of others?
To pose the question in a different way, would the outcome have been
different if the minor had only been injured and brought an action for
damages?
G. DAMAGES
In Braddock v. Seaboard Airline Railroad,"" the court was presented,
inter alia, with the question of reduction of damages. The exact question
had not heretofore been decided by the supreme court. The father brought
an action for the loss of his son's leg. The jury returned a verdict for the
son of $248,439.00 and $6,500.00 for the father. After the verdict the trial
court ruled there must be a remittitur of $123,431.05 of the judgment for
the son, or if no remittitur, then a new trial. The remittitur was based
upon the son's future earnings. The supreme court reversed. The question
was - is the present worth rule, admittedly applicable to future pecuniary
loss, also applicable to future pain and inconvenience? The weight of
authority is against reduction of damages for future pain and suffering.
Although the question had not previously been decided, the court stated:
Thus, although the question before us was not expressly ruled upon,
the suggestion is strong that the problem of mathematical reduction
to present value does not attend the determination of damages
for future pain, suffering, and inconvenience. And we think such
suggestion is consistent with our considered view of the question
present here, and accords with the weight of authority in this
country.31
Hence, it may be fairly presumed that the Florida law is now against
reduction of damages regarding future pain and suffering.
H. IMPUTED NEcLIcENCE
It is believed by the authors that the case of Ward v. Baskin, 2 is one
case that all practicing attorneys should become familiar with. Here the
plaintiff instituted the action against the defendant as the next of friend
of his minor child and in his individual capacity, for the injuries sustained
by the minor, resulting from the alleged negligent operation of the de-
fendant's automobile. The jury returned a verdict for the child, and against
the father. The father appealed, and the supreme court reversed. The
28. Id. at 317.
29. Ibid.
30. 80 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1955).
31. Id. at 667.
32. 94 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1957).
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appellant contended that the trial judge committed error in instructing the
jury that contributory negligence of the mother would bar the father's
action in his individual capacity. The court held that the mere relationship
of husband and wife was not a sufficient basis upon which to impute to
either spouse, the negligence of the other. The appellee relied upon the
Klepper v. Breslin decision, 33 in his contention that the judge's charge to
the jury was correct. The court, in the instant case, took this opportunity
to distinguish this case from the facts as they were in the Klepper case,
as much confusion had arisen out of that decision. In the Kiepper case,
the father brought the action under the Wrongful Death Statute and it was
held that the wife's contributory negligence was a bar to the husband's
recovery. "The peculiarity consists in the provision that when suing for the
wrongful death of a minor child, the father is authorized to recover damages
not only for the loss of services but also for the mental pain and suffering
of himself and his wife. We emphasized that the damage award under the
statute was an indivisible one." 34 In distinguishing the two cases, it should
be noted that in the Ward case, the action was not under the Wrongful
Death Statute, but rather for injury to the child. Associate Justice Parks
dissented on the ground that the wife and husband have a joint responsi-
bility in the care and custody of the children, and while the husband is
away earning the family's living, this in itself should not release him from
this responsibility.
Although the dissent in the Ward case is of much merit, those
practicing law in Florida will do well to keep the aforementioned distinction
in mind.
I. NUISANCE
In Lawrence v. Eastern Air Lines 5 the plaintiff brought an action
against the defendant airline for damages, claiming that the airline in
substantially raising the elevation of its land without providing adequate
drainage, had changed the natural flow of surface waters so that they
settled on an injured plantiff's property. Defendant contended, among other
allegations, that the plaintiff had acquired his property after the elevation
and paving of the airline's property. The supreme court held that the fact
of "coming to a nuisance" is no defense.
Although this view is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions, it
was wisely criticized by the University of Florida Law Review,36 where the
author felt more thorough treatment should have been given to this case
of first impression in view of industrial expansion. It was suggested that "the
test of reasonableness, considering priority of occupation along with all
33. 83 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1955); See, Case Comment, 9 U. FLA. L. REV. 230
34. See note 32 suora at 860.
35. 81 So.2d 632 (F12. 1955).
36. Case Comment, 9 U. FLA. L. Rsv. 228 (1956).
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other factors, offers a more satisfactory approach to a solution of the
conflicting interests in expanding communities."3 7
J. STATUTORY PROLEMS
(1) Wrongful Death Statutes.-The cases discussed in this section of
the survey deal primarily with problems presented by issues concerning
the operation or interpretation of the Wrongful Death Statutes. Other cases
where action was brought to recover for a wrongful death, but in which
the issues were of a more general interest, are classified under other sections.
The common law did not provide a remedy for wrongful death, 38
yet the statutory history of the actions in Florida dates back to 1883.11 In
view of this long history, it was surprising to find several important cases
of first impression decided by the Florida Supreme Court during this
survey period.
Wrongful death actions in this state are covered by the first three
sections of Chapter 768 of the Florida Statutes. The wording of these
sections, viewed against the chronology of their adoption, indicates that
they compose not one but two separate and distinct wrongful death
statutes, each creating a wholly different remedial right. Sections 768.01
and 768.02 in concert are treated by the courts as allowing an action for
the wrongful death of any person in favor of a surviving spouse, their minor
children, other dependents or the decedent's estate in the alternative and
in that order. This is not an action for pain and suffering or other losses
of the decedent but rather for loss occasioned by the untimely death of
the decedent which inheres to the particular member of one of the
enumerated classes of beneficiaries who is bringing the action. In the
words of the Florida Supreme Court, it is "an entirely new cause of action,
in an entirely new right, for the recovery of damages suffered by them
[the beneficiaries], not the decedent, as a consequence of the wrongful
invasion of their legal right by the tortfeasor."'ll
The second wrongful death statute in Florida is covered by section
768.03 which allows an action to be brought by a father, or in the alternative
a mother, for the wrongful death of his minor children. The elements of
damages which may be recovered under this section are for (1) the loss
of services of the minor child and (2) the mental pain and suffering of
the parent (or both parents).
For purposes of clarification, the first wrongful death statute composed
of sections 768.01 and 768.02 will be referred to throughout this survey
as the "Adult Statute," although conceivably an action could be maintained
37. Id. at 230.
38. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
39. See, Brailsford v. Campbell, 89 So.2d 241,242 (Fla. 1956).
40. Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So.2d 213 (1946).
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under these sections by the estate of a deceased minor orphan, and the
second wrongful death statute composed of section 768.03 will be referred
to as the "Minor Statute."
With this background we now turn to an examination of the recent
cases. The first case of note, Shiver v. Sessions,41 falls under the "Adult
Statute." Mr. Sessions shot his wife and then took his own life. His step-
children thereafter brought an action against his estate for the wrongful
death of their mother. Defendant's counsel contended that in order for
a plaintiff to succeed under this statute it is necessary that the alleged
wrongful act or conduct be "such as would, if death had not ensued, have
entitled the party injured thereby to maintain an action . . . and to recover
damages in respect thereof." 42 Counsel then argued that if Mrs. Sessions
had survived, she could not have sued her husband in tort because of the
established rule that neither a husband nor a wife can maintain an action
against the other for torts committed upon them.4 Accepting these Iwo
propositions, the trial judge dismissed the children's complaint. On appeal,
the supreme court reversed holding that since the children were suing
as beneficiaries under the statute on a new cause of action for a violation
of their right and that since the wife's disability to sue is personal to her
and does not inhere to the tort itself, it should not inhere to her children
in their action. The court further concurred in the reasoning of several
other states44 which held that since the immunity of coveture is retained
in modern times to preserve marital harmony, and the need for marital
harmony ceases with the death of a spouse, the immunity should not
inhere to a third person; and the fact that a wrongful death action is
independent and arises only upon death is ample justification itself for not
barring suit because of personal relationships between the decedent and
the tort-feasor.
In a companion case, Sullivan v. Sessions,4 where the action was
brought on the same facts by the estate of Mrs. Sessions, recovery was
denied on the theory that although Mrs. Sessions' disability was personal
to her and does not inhere to the tort itself, the administratrix of her
estate was her personal representative who "stands in her shoes."
Broadly stated the issue in the Sessions cases was: may an action be
maintained for wrongful death under this statute that could" not have been
brought had the decedent lived? The answer would seem to be that such
action can be maintained so long as it is not brought by the decedent's
estate. Does this holding conflict with the wording of section 768.01
which requires that the wrongful act or misconduct be "such as would,
41. 80 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1955); Case Comment, 9 U. FtA. L. REv. 110 (1956).
42. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1957).
43. Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (F1a. 1950).
44. Rodney v. Staman, 371 Pa. 1, 89 A.2d 313 (1952); Welch v. Davis, 410
111 130, 101 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1951).
45. 80 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1955).
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if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured thereby to maintain
an action . . ."? It is submitted that it does not. A reasonable interpretation
of the statute, in view of social policy to provide for the dependents of
persons who meet their death at the hands of a tort-feasor, is that the
nature of the wrongful act or conduct must be tortious when measured by
the traditional rules that make up the body of our substantive tort law
The limitation of the statutory provision is not on the right to sue, but
goes to the cause itself. It is the alleged misconduct of the defendant,
apart from any disabilities or immunities of the parties to sue or be sued,
which must constitute a traditional substantive tort.
It is often said by our courts that the Wrongful Death Statutes
create a new cause of action. 8 What is a cause of action? One definition
might be that it is a course of misconduct directed toward a person ol
property for which the law provides a remedy. It is the misconduct alone
which constitutes the cause of the action. It is the allowance of a remed)
which constitutes the action. These matters are separate and distinct. Both
the misconduct and the right to redress constitute what is commonly
referred to in our jurisprduence as a "cause of action." 47 In this sense it
is clear that our Wrongful Death Statutes do not create a new cause ol
action, for they do not prescribe any new course of conduct or misconduct
or cause for an action-the courts must look to our substantive tort prin.
ciples to determine what constitutes misconduct under the statute. The
statutes do, however, prescribe a new remedy and enumerate certain nero
elements of damages. In the Sessions cases the misconduct was the wilful]
shooting of a human being. Such behavior has always been considered
misconduct in our society whether the injury results in death or not. These
statutes provide a new remedy based on a violation of "the right whicl
the family of the deceased had to the companionship, services or support
of the decedent, coupled with the expectancy of a participation in the
46. See note 40 suora.
47. There are several traditional definitions of what constitutes a cause of actior
which may be found in CLARK, CooE PLEADINGS § 19 (Zd Ed. 1947) none of which art
wholly identical which the view setforth by the authors of this survey. It is believe&
that any action must be based on the violation of a substantive duty, but this alone
will not permit the recovering of damages-a right to sue is sometimes wanting. It i,
a simple matter in drafting legislation or writing decisions or in defining legal concept,
to make reference to such illusive terms as rights, duties, privileges, immunities, sub
stantive, primary etc.. . Apart from a fact pattern or a course of conduct, however
these are meaningless abstract terms which tend more to cause confusion than to aic
in solving problems. It is only after a person acts or behaves that one injured therebi
goes to court and alleges misconduct. lhe court, judge and jury, must then examine
the fact of such behavior and determine if it constitutes legal misconduct. In makinj
this determination they must look beyond a statute allowing recovery for wrongfu,
death-unless it spells out what it is that makes the death wrongful instead of merel)
naming parties who can recover after the issue of wrongfulness is decided. It is in thit
sense-when examining statutory actions and/or statutes altering causes--that the
authors feel it is important for the court to clearly distinguish between the elements
of a "cause of action" and not in the pleadings sense, where the issue centers on th(
sufficiency of the complaint or declaration. Both contexts are important but the problem
in these cases is not one of procedural law.
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estate which such person might have -accumulated bad his life not been
brought to an untimely end by the infliction-of the injury.11
48
It would then seem that the present status of Florida law in regard
to these statutes is: (1) that in determining whether or not there is a cause
for an action, the courts will look to the substantive tort law as it exists
at common law, or as modified by the legislature, and (2) in determining
whether the particular plaintiff before them has a remedy, and what his
elements of damages may be, the courts will look to the Wrongful Death
Statute. In short, in looking for a tort they will look to the act and not
the actors-in looking for a remedy they will look to the remedial statutes.
In the opinion of the authors such practice would be sound and in con-
formity with the views of our society.
Keeping in mind that in general useage a "cause of action" consists
of (1) a course of misconduct and (2) a remedy for injuries received
therefrom, we turn to an examination of a subsequent Florida case, Brails-
ford v. Campbell" which falls under the "Minor Statute." In that case
an eighteen year old minor was killed while riding as a guest in the defen-
dant's automobile. An action was brought by the decedent's mother in two
counts alleging simple negligence in the first and gross negligence in the
second. The trial judge, upon defendant's motion, dismissed the first count
on the ground that the Florida Guest Statute,50 which requires that gross
negligence be proven to find liability against a host-driver of an auto-
mobile, was applicable and barred recovery on the claim of simple negligence.
On appeal, this ruling was affirmed in a three to two decision. In the
majority opinion, Mr. Justice Terrell stated: "we do not construe the Guest
Statute as applying to actions only by the injured guest or to 'derivative'
actions. . . The Guest Statute in express terms applies to "a cause of
action for damages . . . for injury, death or loss . . . ."51 This statement
that the Guest Statute applies to a cause of action is in conformity with
the practice of looking to the act and not the actors, or parties before the
court, in determining the existence of a tort. It is said that there are three
types of guest statues. 52 The first type limits the guest's right of recovery,
the second limits the liability of the owner or operator and the third
precludes the guest or his survivor from bringing an action in the absence
of gross negligence. It is submitted, however, that despite the wording of
the particular statutes the policy underlying them all is to afford the benefit
of limited liability to owners or operators of automobiles who gratuitously
transport passengers. In other words, the legislature has imposed a limitation
on the substantive tort itself by modifying what would constitute legal
misconduct toward a guest in an automobile. The limitation, though it may
48. Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 la. 735, 25 So.2d 213,220 (1946).
49. 89 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1956).
50. FLA. STAT. J 320.59 (1957).
51. Id. at 242.
52. Note, 11 Min L.Q. 149 (1956).
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be expressed as a immunity to suit or a limitation on the right to sue, goes
to the cause itself and does not merely alter the remedy.
The dissenting opinion in the Brails-ford case found conflict in subject-
ing the right of action for the death of a minor to the proof of gross
negligence under the Guest Statute. If, however, in looking for the tort
under the Wrongful Death Statute, it is seen that the alleged wrongful
act was a course of conduct which does not constitute tortious misconduct
under the common law as modified by the legislature the seeming conflict
disappears. These decisions give a remedial effect to the Wrongful Death
Statutes and a substantive effect to the Guest Statute-the former creating
a right of action, the latter limiting a cause of action.
The final case of note in a wrongful death action, Parker v. Jackson-
vile 3 was brought by a widow under the "Adult Statute." The defendant
city raised a twelve month statute of limitations54 which provided that "No
action shall be brought against any city . . . for any negligent or wrongful
injury or damage to person or property unless brought within 12
months . . . ." as a defense. The widow appealed a ruling that this
limitation barred her action and contended that such actions remain subject
to the two year limitation on "An action arising upon account of an act
causing a wrongful death."55 The supreme court reversed the ruling and
held that the twelve month limitation afforded to cities was not applicable
to actions for wrongful death. The court said, "We do not interpret [this
limitation] as applying to all actions for damages, of whatever kind, against
the city; it applies to 'negligent or wrongful'-that is, tortious-conduct
which injures a person or damages his property.""6 This holding was not
without precedent. In Marsh v. Miami 57 in 1935 the supreme court held
that a charter provision limiting actions arising out of tort did not bar
actions for wrongful death. There the court said, "A tort action and an
action for wrongful death are not synonymous, nor are they interchange-
able."
Thus it would seem that an action for wrongful death is not a tort in
Florida; it is undoubtedly not a contract nor a crime either. Perhaps it is
considered a statutory action and nothing more-a misfit in the traditional
scheme of classification. But what it is called is not important so long as
the court does not lose sight of the fact that it is a wrongful death and
that the character of its wrongfulness must be measured by substantive tort
principles.
Perhaps there is some practical policy consideration in withholding
immunity from suit from a city for an additional year when the right of
53. 82 So.ld 131 (Fla. 1955).
54. FLA. STAT. § 95.24 (1957).
55. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6) (1957).
56. See, Cristiani v. Saratoga, 65 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1953).
57. 119 Fla. 123,124, 160 So. 893,894 (1935).
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action rests with a widow, after the city's wrongful conduct has culminated
in a death, than when the right rests with the injured party themselves.
And perhaps the choice of the wording "wrongful injury to person or
property" as used by the legislature was intended to mean physical injury
to a physical person or physical property and not legal injury to a legal
person or their legal property. Whatever the reason may be, if indeed one
exists, there would be less confusion in this area of law if the courts would
at least admit that an action for wrongful death is in the nature of a tort
or is a tort and find other justification for allowing the longer period of
limitation.
(2) Guest Statutes.-Several cases of note were decided concerning the
Florida Guest Statute5" which were cases of first impression.
Fishbaek v. Yale 0 presented the question of whether a person who is
injured while outside of a vehicle, but who had received free transportation
therein, was considered a guest and required to prove gross negligence for
his injury. In Fishback the plaintiff was being transported to a hunting
lodge in the defendant's automobile. Upon reaching the entrance to a
private road leading to the lodge building, which building was the plaintiff's
ultimate destination, the plaintiff stepped out of the automobile and walked
in front of it to open a gate. The defendant's automobile negligently
lurched forward and crushed the plaintiff's leg against a gate post. Plaintiff
was denied recovery for failing to prove gross negligence. In affirming this
decision the supreme court pointed out that the Florida Statute referred
to a "person transported" instead of a person injured during a ride60 and
construed this to limit liability not only during a ride, but during the entire
undertaking of receiving free transportation. The answer to the question
presented, then, would seem to be that the guest relationship continues
whether or not the guest is physically positioned in or outside of the auto-
mobile and is not terminated until the entire undertaking is completed.
This decision is in accord with other jurisdictions having similar statutes
to Florida's.61
In Roberts v. Braynone2 the plaintiff had been visiting from New York
and had been a social guest in the defendant's home. On the day of the
accident the plaintiff, the defendant and the defendant's two minor children
drove toward town for the dual purpose of securing an airline reservation
for the plaintiff to return home and allowing the defendant to stop at
his laundry. Prior to leaving the defendant's home, it was agreed that the
plaintiff would remain in the car and watch the children' while the defendant
was in the laundry. When the defendant raised the guest statute as a
58. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1957).
59. 85 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1955).
60. See, Case Comment, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 235,236 (1956).
61. Ibid; for an interesting casenote discussing the various types of guest statutes
see, Note, 11 MiaMI L.Q. 149 (1956).
62. 90 So.2d 623 (Fia. 1956).
1958]
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defense to the plaintiff's claim of ordinary negligence, the plaintiff con-
tended that the trip was a "joint venture," not a guest-host relationship,
and therefore the statute should not apply. The alleged consideration was
watching the children in return for transportation. A dismissal of the com-
plaint without prejudice was affirmed on appeal. The court held that the
social relationship of house guest carried throughout the occurrence and
that the mutual favors were of a hospitable character rather than as a legal
consideration.03
The final case of Bolick v. Sperry64 was brought under the guest statute
and a verdict was rendered for the guest on proving that one of the defen-
dants had pleaded guilty to a criminal charge of reckless driving based on
the same accident. On appeal, the verdict was set aside on the ground that
whereas mere speeding could violate the penal act, it could not as a matter
of law constitute gross negligence under the Guest Statute. It is difficult
to conceive that speeding, presumably at any speed, at any time and at
any place, could never be found by reasonable men to constitute gross
negligence. Or does the standard that these questions are matters of fact
for a jury, unless reasonable men could not disagree upon them, not apply
to cases under the Florida Guest Statute?5
(3) Federal Statutes-Federal Employer's Liability Act.-The authors
selected two cases dealing with the Federal Employer's Liability Act during
the survey period, one on the basis that it was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court and the other because it dealt with the Statute of Limita-
tions. In the first case, Seaboard Airline Railroad v. Strickland,66 a railroad
employee brought an action against the company for injuries sustained
while working beneath a railroad car. The lower court entered judgment
for the employee and the Florida Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiff
contended that the defendant had not provided him with a safe place to
work. The court held that the Federal Employer's Liability Act does not
make the railroad company an insurer, as the basis of liability is proof of
negligence. In the instant case, the court found an absence of probative
facts to support the judgment. Since there was a federal question involved,
it was taken on certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which
reversed by merely citing the case of Bailey v. Central Vermont Railroad"
which held that the employee has federally created rights and the proof
of negligence is to be a question for the jury.
63. See also: Yokons v. Rodriquez, 41 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1949); McDougal v.
Covey, 150 Fla. 748, 9 So.2d 187 (1942); But see Perry v. Mershon, 149 Fla. 351,
5 So.2d 694 (1942) where watching defendant's children in the car was held to be
consideration since the plaintiff was a regular nurse and governess for the children.
64. 88 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1956).
65. For an interesting case involving the Guest Statute see, Bailsford v. Campbell
in the Wrongful Death Statute section of this survey, page 483.
66. 80 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1955).
67. 319 U.S. 350 (1943).
[VOL. XI I
TORTS
The other case is that of Seaboard Air Line Railroad Y. Ford6" which
dealt with the question as to when the statute of limitations will commence
to run. The decision of the court was that where an employee contracts an
occupational disease, the statute of limitations under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act,"" does not, begin to run until the employee "knows or
should have known that the disease was occupational in origin, even though
diagnosis of the exact cause has not yet been made."70
Same-Jones Act.-Although the case about to be discussed is not a
Florida case and was decided subsequent to the survey period, the authors
feel that it is of such importance, that it should be included. In Kernan Y.
American Dredging Company7' suit was brought by the administrator of
the estate of a seaman who lost his life on board a tug, while towing a scow.
The tug caught fire when an open flame kerosene lamp on the deck of
the scow ignited inflammable vapors lying above an extensive accumulation
of petroleum products spread over the surface of the river. The trial court,
inter alia, found the defendant had violated a navigation rule promlugated
by the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. 72 The trial court
also found that the vapor would not have been ignited if the lamp had
been carried at the required height. Hence, the question presented was
whether the violation of the statute, which dealt with navigation, imposed
liability upon the defendant for the seaman's death. The trial court found
that it did not and this was confirmed by the court of appeals. On certiorari,
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court first cited cases
involving claims under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, which have
all held that a violation of the Safety Appliances Act or the Boiler Inspection
Acts creates liability irrespective of negligence. Hence, the court was faced
with the problem of whether, in the absence of any showing of negligence,
the Jones Act, which in'terms incorporates the provisions of the Federal
Employer's Liability Act, permits recovery for the death of a seaman
resulting from a violation of a statutory duty. Both the Federal Employer's
Liability Act and the Jones Act impose upon the employer the duty
of paying damages when an injury to the worker is caused in whole or in
part, by the employer's fault. The lower courts applied the general tort
doctrine which limits recovery only where the injury is one which the
statute was designed to prevent. However, the decision stated that the Court
had repeatedly refused to apply such a limiting doctrine on cases arising
out of the Federal Employer's Liability Act. The majority also pointed
68. 92 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1955).
69. 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.
70. See note 68 supra at 165.
71. 78 Sup. Ct. 394 (1958).
72. 33 CFR § 80.16 (h). "The white light shall be carried not less than 8 feet
above the surface of the water..." The Commandant is empowered by 30 Stat. 102
(1897), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 157 (1952), to establish rules "as to the lights to be
carried... as he . .. (may deem necessary for safety) .... ." This section was established,
inter alia, for the prevention of collisions.
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out that although most of the cases cited which delimited the general tort
doctrine involved violations of the Safety Appliance Act or the Boiler In-
spection Acts; there was no particular relationship between them and
the Federal Employer's Liability Act, and that it was not the nature of
the acts violated which is the controlling consideration, but rather the
basis of liability is the Federal Employer's Liability Act itself. The majority
reasoned that the deceased seaman in the instant case, was in a position
anologous to that of railroad workers, and the principles governing cases
concerning them should apply here. Tlere was a very strong dissenting
opinion by Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, Burton and Whittaker. The
minority believed that in the passing of the Safety Appliance Act and
the Boiler Inspection Acts it was the intent of Congress to provide special
treatment to employees injured by violation of these acts. The dissent
relied heavily upon the words, "any statute enacted for the safety of
employees," 73 which referred to the two acts, and that there was no
absolute liability attached to the violations of any statute (meaning any
other statute). In the instant case, it no where appears that Congress had
the intention of affording additional rights to seamen, but on the contrary,
the purpose of the statute was simply to prevent collisions.
It should also be noted that Justice Frankfurter wrote a memorandum
explaining why he participated in the dissenting opinion. Justice Frank-
furter has refrained, for almost a decade, from participating in the substan-
tive disposition of cases arising under the Federal Employer's Liability Act
and the Jones Act. However, in this case he considered that it was his
duty to participate, since it dealt with a construction of a statute of nation-
wide importance.
It is submitted that the majority has applied an ultra liberal construction
to a violation of a statutory duty. The question of concern now is, how far
is this doctrine going to be extended and in what fields may it next be
applied?
(4) Release or covenant not to sue-Joint Tort-feasors. "A release or
covenant not to sue as to one tort-feasor for property damage to, personal
injury of, or the wrongful death of any person shall not operate to release
or discharge the liability of any other tort-feasor who may be liable for the
same tort or death."7
This section was added to the Florida Statutes during the last legislative
session and is of considerable importance, in that it abrogates the common
law in regard to releases. The common law approach as to covenants not
to sue is that the plaintiff does not surrender his cause of action, but merely
agrees that he will not enforce it, and becomes liable for an equivalent
amount of damages if he does. This covenant does not discharge other
73. 36 STAT. 298 (1910); 45 U.S.C. e. 1 (1952).
74. FLA. STAT. § 54.28(1) (1957).
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tort-feasors. On the other hand a release discharges all tort-feasors. A
minority of jurisdictions subscribe to the view, that in the absence of a
statute to the contrary, such a release does not operate as a discharge. 5
Prior to the enactment of the aforementioned statute, Florida subscribed
to the majority view. In the case of Martin v. Burney0 the court held
that the release of one point tort-feasor is the release of all. In the case of
Miller v. Panossian,77 the court held that where the plaintiff executed an
instrument styled, "Covenant not to sue," in favor of one joint tort-feasor,
this did not operate to discharge the others. In the case of Atlantic Coast
Line v. Boone,8 the court made clear the distinctions between a release
and a covenant not to sue. In Florida, a release discharges all tort-feasors,
even though the parties stipulated that the release of one shall not discharge
the others. "The key to the whole problem is that the injured party, if he
desires merely to execute a covenant not to sue, should make the covenant
with and for the benefit of the particular joint tort-feasor only."7 "A release
is an outright cancellation or discharge of the entire obligation as to one
or all of the alleged joint wrongdoers. A covenant not to sue recognizes
that the obligation or liability continues, but the injured party agrees not
to assert any rights grounded thereon against a particular covenantee."' 80
However, now that Florida has enacted a statute abrogating the common
law release and placing it in the same category as a covenant not to sue,
it may be supposed that Florida attorneys will no longer be plagued with
this problem, although the authors did not find any cases interpreting the
statute.
II. EXTENSION OF LIABILITY
A. PARENT AND CHILD
There was very little activity in this field in the past two years. There
was, however, one interesting case decided by the Florida Supreme Court
regarding the parents' liability for the torts committed by their offspring.
In Gissin v. Goodwill,8' a case of first impression in Florida, the supreme
court upheld a lower court decision which was adverse to the plaintiff.
A hotel employee was injured by the child of the guests at the hotel.
The complaint in essence, read as follows: that Geraldine Goodwill, eight
years of age, did intentionally and maliciously slam a door on the hand
of the plaintiff with such force as to cause the severance of one finger.
The complaint also stated that the parents were negligent in failing to
restrain the child, whom they knew to have dangerous tendencies etc., and
75. PROssER, TORTS p. 245 (2d ed. 1955).
76. 34 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1948).
77. 88 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1956).
78. 85 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1956).
79. Id. at 843.
80. Ibid.
81. 80 So2d 701 (Fla. 1955).
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also that Geraldine had committed other wanton and malicious acts upon
other guests, i.e., striking them. The court, in its opinion, cited cases from
other jurisdictions and in synthesizing these cases came to the conclusion
that all of them had one common denominator; that being the assessment
of liability only where it appeared the child had the habit of doing the
particular wrongful act complained of. In applying this criterion, the supreme
court reasoned that the instant case did not have this "common denominator"
in as much as it did not appear that Geraldine was in the habit of slamming
doors on other people. Although this appears to be the weight of authority,
the result is a rather inequitable one. While the parent, in this state, is
not liable for the torts of his minor because of the mere fact of paternity,
nevertheless, it would appear, that if it is plainly shown by the facts, that
the child was actually possessed of vicious tendencies and the parents knew
or should have known of them, then liability should attach, even though
the specific wrongful conduct was not known to be habitual.
B. MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY
There was one case decided during the period of the survey that the
authors felt should be noted. That was the case of Matthews v. Lawnite
Company.82 The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of lawn chairs. The injury
occurred as follows: the plaintiff while inspecting the manufacturer's
product on display in a retail store sat in the chair to "try it out." As the
plaintiff sat down, his hand protruded over the front of one of the arm-
rests, and the movement of a mechanical part of the chair, completely
severed one of the plaintiff's fingers. There was nothing to indicate to the
plaintiff that beneath the armrest there were moving metal parts, so
constructed that they would amputate the occupants fingers "with the ease
that one chips a choice flower with pruning shears." The lower court entered
judgment for the defendant and the supreme court reversed. The court stated
that it had several times departed from the old common law rule that
denied recovery to innocent third party purchasers from a retailer because
of the absence of privity. In these cases the court held the manufacturer
liable on an implied warranty, as for example, where food in sealed con-
tainers was the subject of litigation, qualifying this by stating that the
implied warranty only protects against a usual or apparent use of the subject
matter, and not against the careless use of a dangerous mechanism. The
court found that a lawn chair was not a "dangerous instrument." However,
the moving parts of the chair were completely concealed from the plaintiff,
and as essential parts thereof, were inherently dangerous. The court also
made the observation that the modern trend today is to abandon the old
common law rule, and to allow recovery, although there is no privity of
contract. It was not too clear to the authors whether the court reversed
82. 88 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
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on the grounds of a breach of an implied warranty, or whether there had
been a breach of duty to the expectant users of the product by the con-
cealment of the "inherently dangerous" moving parts of the chair, so as to
base the recovery upon the manufacturer's negligence.
C. MUNrCIPAL TORT LIABIrLIT
With the exception of the three cases which will be subsequently noted,
this area of tort law was very inactive. The first case of any consequence
is that of Rabin v. Lake Worth "Drainage District.83 A landowner brought
an action for damages against the drainage district, alleging that due to the
district's spraying of a canal with certain chemicals, in order to destroy
water hyacinths, that the land-owner suffered crop retardation. The lower
court entered judgment for the drainage district which was affirmed by the
supreme court. The decision cited cases from other jurisdictions dealing
with drainage districts, those decisions holding the districts to be govern-
mental agencies, upon which no tort liability would attach, "there being no
specific statutory provision to modify the general rule of non-liability." In
support of these holdings, a prior Florida case was cited, Arundel Corpora-
tion v. Griffin,84 which the court further stated, harmonizes with the decisions
from other jurisdictions. The court made a further observation stating:
If the doors of the court must now be opened to appellant they
should have, by the same token, been required to be opened in the
many cases reaching this court where cities and towns were held
not liable despite the merits of the plaintiff's claims.85
For this observation the court cited Wilford v. Jacksonville Beach"8
which held:
Whatever the law may be elsewhere, it has long been established
in this jurisdiction that a municipal corporation is not liable for
the tortious acts of its police officers committed as incident to the
exercise of a purely governmental function. (Emphasis added)
The court posed another very interesting question, that being: if the
appellant had obtained a judgment, how would he go about collecting it?
Since the financial support of the drainage district is obtained only through
assessments made upon the various parcels of land according to the benefits
derived, then any judgment obtained against the district would have to be
paid upon the theory that by the commission of the tort the lands in the
district were benefited. It is submitted that this is a good question. justice
Thornal concurred specially, in that he thought the drainage district should
be thought of as more nearly like a municipality than a state agency. Also
83. 82 Sold 353 (Fla. 1955).
84. 89 Fla. 128, 103 So. 422 (1925).
85. Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist. 82 So.2d 353, 355 (Fla. 1955).
86. 79 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1955).
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the General Drainage District Act 87 authorizes the levying of taxes only
for specified purposes, and the taxing powers of the board of supervisors
cannot be exercised for any other purpose.
The next case, although not directly related to tort liability, was that
of Buck v. Hallendale88 which dealt with conditions precedent in bringing
a suit against the city. The charter required that notice of any tort claim
against the city must be filed with the city commission with such reasonable
specifications as to time, place and witnesses as would enable the city to
investigate the matter. The plaintiff's attQrney merely addressed a letter to
the mayor stating his client would sue, which contained no further informa-
tion. The supreme court was of the opinion that the plaintiff did not sub-
stantially comply with the charter requirement and affirmed the lower
court's summary judgment for the defendant. It appears that although there
was no substantial compliance, the city had actual knowledge of the pending
suit and did in fact investigate the matter. The majority, however, reasoned
that although there was actual notice, this still did not cure the defect.
There were three justices dissenting, on the ground that Hallendale is a
small town, and although only the mayor had been notified, this constituted
notice to the commission. Also, the minority placed much importance on the
fact that the city had actual notice, and did in fact conduct an investigation.
It is submitted that the better reasoned view is that of the minority. It
would appear that the city waived full compliance of the charter require-
ment, by its conduct in investigating the matter and then proceeding to
trial. Since the city had actual notice of the accident and knowledge of
the details, then how could the city be heard to complain that there had
not been a substantial compliance, where the only logical reason for the
requirement is to give the city time to investigate and prepare its defense?
The last but certainly not the least of the three cases is Hargrove v.
Cocoa Beach,9 which could be termed the leading case in the United States
in the field of municipal tort law. The case involved a widow, suing the
city for the wrongful death of her husband, who died as a result of suffoca-
tion by smoke, after being locked in the town jail and left unattended
by the jailer. The lower court granted the dismissal of the complaint, upon
the ground that the city is immune from liability for the wrongful acts of
its police officers. The supreme court reversed, citing Tallahassee v. Fortune90
as the original Florida precedent. This case held that where one suffers a
personal injury, proximately resulting from negligence of an employee of
the municipality, the individual is entitled to damages for the wrongdoing.
However, cases subsequent to this decision did not follow the precedent.
Was it because of a misinterpretation of the decision, or did the courts
87. FLA. STAT. c. 298 (1957).
88. 85 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1956).
89. 96 So.2d 130 gFla. 1957).
90. 3 Fla. 19 (185 ).
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just not like it and decided to ignore it? It is submitted that neither of
these are the reasons, but that in fact, the case had been entirely over-
looked.
It is submitted that in this respect, the Florida Supreme Court decision
shows a progressive attitude toward this age old problem of municipal
immunity in respect to the so called "governmental functions." It would be
needless to cite authority for the proposition that the almost universal rule
is that municipalities are not liable for the torts committed by its officers
or agents while in the performance of governmental functions. Hence, it
would appear that Florida stands alone, or at least with a very small
minority of jurisdictions, in holding to the contrary.
The majority view appears to stem from the old adage, "the king can
do no wrong." This doctrine of municipal tort immunity has become firmly
entrenched in our jurisprudence. The case of Russell v. Devon County"'
has been regarded as the first case establishing the fundamental principle
that a political subdivision of the state is not liable for the acts committed
by its officers or agents while in the performance of some governmental
function. Although this doctrine has been criticized by judges as well as -legal
scholars, the courts have still seen fit not to overthrow it. The main difficulty
lies in determining what functions are governmental and those that are
proprietary. Because of this distinction, the decisions have been somewhat
anomalous to say the least, and in some instances, because of the inequities
encompassed in permitting the immunity, the courts have done everything
in their power to circumvent the effect of the doctrine. The question which
remains to be answered is whether, by the Hargrove decision, Florida has
in effect abolished these distinctions in toto. It is submitted that this
approach would be more in keeping with our concepts of justice as embodied
in our democratit system of government.
Query: If the Hargrove case had been decided prior to the Rabin case,
would the outcome of the Rabin case have been different? Assuming for the
moment that it would have been, then by the reasoning of the court as
to the collectibility of the judgment, how would this have been dealt with?
Also, by the reasoning of Justice Thornal, how would his interpretation of
the General Drainage ActW 2 be reconciled with the judgment rendered
against the district?
Ii. INTENTIONAL TORTS
Although there was very little activity in this field of tort law,
there were, however, several cases of interest which the authors felt
should be noted.
91. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1798).
92. FLA. STAT. C. 298 (1957).
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A. MALICIOUS PROSECUrION
In the cast of Goldstein v. Sabella,93 a case of first impression,
the facts were as follows: in a prior suit Sabella (landlord) brought
eviction proceedings against Goldstein (tenant). In that action judgment
was entered for Sabella, but on appeal was reversed by the circuit court.
Thereafter Goldstein brought this action against Sabella for malicious
prosecution. The complaint alleged the lack of probable cause in the
prior action. The complaint was dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed
by the supreme court. There are three views dealing with the effect of a
judgment of conviction, on the question of probable cause for instituting
a prosecution. (1) it is conclusive; (2) it is conclusive unless obtained
through corrupt means; and (3) it is only prima facie evidence which
may be rebutted. Probable cause had previously been defined by the court
in the case of Dunnavant v. State4 as follows:
A reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in
the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.
In the instant case, the fact that the judgment was subsequently
reversed does not effect such determination, unless it can be shown that
the judgment.was obtained through fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means.
Hence, the court adopted the second view, which as stated by the court,
is the weight of authority in this country.
B. LIBEL AND SLANDER
In Walsh v. Miami Herald,95 the court was faced with the question,
as to whether a certain newspaper article was actionable per se. The
lower court dismissed the complaint, and on the apreal the supreme
court reversed. The plaintiff was a Miami Beach policeman. The news-
paper article stated in part that, "Miami Beach policemen can and often
do, make laughingstocks of themselves when they testify in court. Oka
acts, when he's oW the bench, as though he puts 'little' or no reliance in
the testimony of Beach policemen ... Such seemed his attitude Septem-
ber 24 when an arresting officer, John Walsh, offered testimony exactly
opposite his own report on an accident."9' 6 After publication of this
article, notice was sent to the paper to retract and the defendant refused
to do so. The court took notice of the fact that due to the volume of news
being printed, that it is subject to errors, and since a retraction could
have been made, in the instant case, and was refused, then the state-
93. 88 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1956).
94. 46 So.2d 871, 874 (Fla. 1950).
95. 80 So.ld 669 (Fla. 1955).
96. Id. at 670. For a more complete report of the article see same page.
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ment could not be considered an error. The court held it to be libelous
per se if "it tends to subject one to distrust, ridicule, contempt, or dis-
grace, or tends to injure one in his trade or profession. '" t
In the case of Adams v. News-Journal Corporation,8 the same
problem was again dealt with by the court, and in this instance the
newspaper article was held not to be libelous per se. Subsequent to this
suit the plaintiff's client was about to make charges in a municipal court,
after an arrest which he had evidently resisted. The plaintiff was an
attorney and in this capacity applied to the circuit court for a writ of
prohibition which was made absolute. The supreme court affirmed. The
newspaper took issue with the plaintiff's conduct, and in a lengthy article,
parts of which are quoted herein, "THERE IS A LIMIT . . ."DECENT CITIZENS
believe there should be a limit to the accusations which a defense attorney
should be allowed to make against law abiding persons, including law
enforcement officers, in any move to protect his client. Attorney Adams
made grave accusations against some of our police officers in his zeal to
save his client.. ."01 The question involved in the instant case, is whether
to plaintiff's standing had been injured or whether, as a result of the
article he might have been held up to hatred, distrust, and so forth.
"We will undertake to interpret the editor's phraseology 'as the common
mind would understand it'."'1°0 After reviewing the article at some length,
the court concluded that it only constituted a criticism, and although by
the use of our "common mind" it can be seen that the plaintiff could be
somewhat "irked," it is clear from the record which would make it libelous
per se. It is to be noted, however, that there were three justices dissenting.
Quoting from Justice Hobson, "With the emphasis upon moral fitness and
public obligation which the profession demands, it follows that to ascribe
unethical conduct to a lawyer is to inpugn his fitness to practice his pro-
fession."'' 1 Justice Roberts in his dissenting opinion reasoned that the
case should be reversed under the authority of the Walsh case.102 It is
noteworthy that Justice Roberts dissented in the Walsh case, holding the
article not to be libelous per se.
It is submitted by the authors that while there have been many nice
rules promulgated by the courts as to what constitutes libel or slander,
it is readily apparent that at best, these are broad guiding principles which
arc to be applied to the peculiar facts of each case, and by the exercise of
the courts' value judgment the decision is then brought about.
97. Id. at 671.
98. 84 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1955).
99. Id. at 550. For entire article see same page.
100. Loeb v. Ceronemus, 66 So.2d 241, 245 (Fla. 1953).
101. See note 93 supra at 553.
102. See note 90 supra.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
C. ASSAULT AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT
In Holley v. Kelley,l" the defendant assaulted the plaintiff with
a shot gun, upon defendant's land. The evidence was in conflict as
to the plaintiff's purpose on the land and his refusal to leave when so
requested by the defendant. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff and
on appeal the supreme court held it to be reversible error for refusing to
give instructions that "if a trespasser upon the land of another refuses to
depart upon request, the owner is authorized to use reasonable and
appropriate means to eject the trespasser from his premises." It should
perhaps be explained why the authors noted such a case as this one. It is
indeed, a rarity, that today, such an elementary question would be pre-
sented to the Florida Supreme Court. In the mind's of the authors, this
is likened to a revisitation of the doctrine of acceptance under Adams v.
Lindsell.
D. PRivAcy
There was a very interesting case decided by the supreme court on the
right of privacy, during the survey period. In the case of Jacova v. Southern
Radio and Television Company0 4 the plaintiff was standing at a cigar
counter in a hotel lobby when confronted by police officers during a gambling
raid. The plaintiff's picture was subsequently displayed on "Reniek's
Reports," but was not described or referred to on the audio portion of the
telecast as a gambler. The trial court granted a motion for summary judg-
ment for the defendants, and the supreme court affirmed. The court held
that the plaintiff's right of privacy was not impaired since he became an
actor in a newsworthy event under impartial reporting and had no right
of privacy in comparison to the public interest even though the TV film
was "canned." Since the object of the film was to portray "today's news
today," time did not allow for the editing of the film based on an investiga-
tion as to the plaintiff's role in the episode.
It is submitted by the authors that this case reflects a balancing of the
interests, and from the facts the decision was a sensible one. Although
it is not the intention of the authors to debate the pro's and con's of the
balancing of such interests, it is asserted that modem man must learn to
inhibit his sensitivity in this era when everyone's business appears to be
the business of everyone else.
E. FRAUD (FALSE REPRESENTATION)
Potakar v. Hurtak'05 presented the age old problem of false representation.
The plaintiff purchased a restaurant from the defendant. The defendant
had stated that the business had a weekly net profit of a certain amount.
103. 91 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1957).
104. 83 So.ld 34 (Fl2. 1955).
105. 82 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1955).
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The plaintiff claimed that he had relied upon this representation, which
later appeared to be false. The lower court dismissed the complaint and
on appeal was affirmed, the court reasoning that even if the defendant's
representation was false, the plaintiff had no right to rely thereon without
first making diligent inquiry.
This case was followed by another interesting case dealing with false
representation. In the case of Board of Public Instruction v. Everett W.
Martin and Son, Incorporated,08 the facts were as follows: the defendant
(contractor) was alleged to have misrepresented to the plaintiff the amount
paid for substituted building materials. It appears that the defendant sub-
stituted a different type of jalousie in the construction of a school building
with the consent of the plaintiff. The defendant, however, paid less for
the substituted jalousies than was reported to the plaintiffs, and the suit
was brought to recover the difference. The lower court entered judgment
for the defendants and on appeal the supreme court reversed. The court
cited American Jurisprudence, 07 "Fraud and Deceit," which states the
rule as followed at the present time in practically all American jurisdiction
is "that one to whom a positive, distinct, and definite representation has
been made, is entitled to rely on such representation and need not make
further inquiry concerning the particular facts involved." Cases were also
cited from other jurisdictions stating the same rule. The court further stated:
"We are of the opinion that in this case, it was not the duty of the Boards
architects to investigate the cost of the substituted material purchased by
the contractor. 08 The court mentioned, in passing, the case of Potakar V.
Hurtak'0' wherein the plaintiffs attempt to rescind the contract upon the
ground of misrepresentation, the court held that the plaintiff must make
a diligent inquiry into the facts presented and gave judgment for the
defendant.
106. 97 So.ld 21 (Fla. 1957).
107. 23 Am. t. § 161 (1942).
108. Id. at 27.
109. See note 104 supra.
